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

THE NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY: STATUS REPORT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

OCTOBER 18, 1990

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(101st Congress)

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THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: STATUS REPORT

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1990

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m., in room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William J. Hughes, acting chairman, presiding.

Present: Representatives William J. Hughes, Solomon P. Ortiz, Kweisi Mfume, Donald M. Payne, Lawrence Coughlin, Michael G. Oxley, F. James Sensenbrenner, Robert K. Dornan, James M. Inhofe, Wally Herger, Bill Paxon, and Bill Grant.

Staff Present: Edward H. Jurith, staff director; William S. Smith, minority staff director; James Alexander, press officer; Richard Baum, minority professional staff; Jennifer Ann Brophy, professional staff; George R. Gilbert, staff counsel; Rebecca L. Hedlund, professional staff; Robyn Rosenblum, professional staff; Sharon Vander Till, minority press secretary; Melanie T. Young, minority professional staff.

OPENING STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. HUGHES (ACTING CHAIRMAN)

Mr. HUGHES. The Select Committee on Narcotics and Control will come to order.

First, I want to apologize on behalf of Charlie Rangel. As you know, he is a senior member of Ways and Means and they are very deeply involved in budget issues. We hope, perhaps, that he might be able to slip in at some point, but that depends upon their schedule.

Over 1 year ago, the President, in addressing the Nation, told us that the drug crisis was a top priority and that he would work to see to it that the strategy put together by William Bennett, the Drug Control Policy Director, would be implemented.

Since that time, the official drug strategy has been followed up with an updated version in January 1990.

The reason we are here today is to review where we are with respect to the National Drug Control Strategy. Our Nation and our Government have been burdened with some critical matters in recent months—the military response to Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf, the faltering economy, and the pursuit of a sound budget process for this country. These issues have dominated the news and have relegated some other concerns to back-seat status.

While all of these situations bear close watching and maximum attention, it is important that we continue to strive to make the drug crisis a top priority. We should not give short shrift to the problems of drug trafficking and drug abuse. We should not push the drug problem further on the back burner because of these other pressing concerns.

Another revision of the Federal Drug Control Strategy is due early next year. We look forward to seeing that plan when released, but I think it is critical for us to make certain that the things that we have put into the strategy to date are working effectively. Are the taxpayers getting a good return on the dollars they are investing in the drug strategy? Are the drug enforcement, treatment and education programs funded by the taxpayers the best they can be? What accountability exists on the Federal level to ensure that they are? In addition, the strategies to date have not addressed the underlying root causes of why so many Americans fall prey to drugs and substance abuse.

There is a whole range of situations, conditions, emotions and environmental factors that lead one to first experiment with and later abuse illegal drugs. No strategy, no amount of money, and no numbers of police, investigators, or court personnel can begin to bring the drug crisis under control unless we figure out specifically what it is that makes people open to such a risky and dangerous proposition.

Our Nation, especially in the inner cities, is inundated with illegal drugs. An entire generation of young Americans remain hostage to the ravages of crack cocaine and other illegal drugs. The severity of the drug crisis in certain parts of the Nation and why people abuse drugs in the first place need to be reflected in our national strategy.

Today, we will hear from Mr. Stanley Morris, Deputy Director for Supply Reduction at the Office of National Drug Policy. Mr. Morris is here representing Mr. Bennett to provide a status report on the strategy for our committee and for the American people, and we look forward to his testimony today.

The Chair recognizes the ranking Republican, the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania.

[Acting Chairman Hughes submitted Chairman Rangel's prepared statement which appears on p. 27.]

OPENING STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE COUGHLIN

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Morris, we want to thank you for being here on such short notice. I know that the Office of Supply Reduction has the responsibility for coordinating a great number of Federal agencies, so we appreciate your taking your time to come here.

On that note, I would like to point out that next Monday, October 22, will mark the 2-year anniversary of the House passage of the 1988 drug bill which created the Office of National Drug Control Policy. In the section of that bill creating your office, Congress made it a priority that ONDCP maintain access to the Congress or committees of either House of Congress to the business of your office. It is my understanding that since the first strategy was

issued 1 year ago, your office has testified on Capitol Hill 24 times. This means that you have had to prepare for almost three hearings every single month. That is a remarkable level of cooperation and access to the Congress given the small size of your agency, and I want to thank you for your efforts.

Congress also expressed the desire, in that 1988 bill, for the Director of ONDCP to consult with State and local officials who are on the front lines of the drug war. That bill created an Associate Director of ONDCP for State and Local Affairs in order to review State and local drug control activities. In this regard, I understand that Dr. Bennett has visited over 100 cities in 49 States in just the last year, and that Judge Walton's travel itinerary would rival that of an airline pilot. This too demonstrates a remarkable level of consultation.

Let me also say that many of us here in Washington recognize the difficulty of your task. I know, for example, when your office says that we need to clean up our cities you get complaints from the rural areas. When you decide in favor of one agency's program, you make an enemy of another agency. When you talk about good law enforcement, people argue that you are ignoring treatment. In short, you can never make everyone happy, but I think one group that you have made happy is the great majority of Americans.

Most Americans have told me they want a government to do what you have recommended. On the supply side, they want to go to the source and disrupt the production of drugs. If that fails, they want us to stop drugs from coming into the United States. When drugs reach our streets, they want the police to bust people who sell them and to keep order in our neighborhoods.

On the demand side, they want to educate our kids against drug use. They want our communities to band together to prevent drug use. They want effective treatment programs for those who have failed to stay drug free. I have found all of these sentiments embodied in your drug strategies. I urge you to keep up the good work and thank you.

Mr. HUGHES. I thank the gentleman. As I indicated in the opening statement, our first witness is Mr. Stanley E. Morris, the Deputy—I am sorry.

Does the gentleman from New Jersey have an opening statement? The gentleman is recognized.

OPENING STATEMENT OF DONALD M. PAYNE

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will try to be brief. But I would like to commend you for calling this important meeting and like to thank our chairman for providing us an opportunity to review the status of the National Drug Control Strategy. With the impending end of the 101st Congress, I feel that this is indeed an appropriate time for review.

I have had the privilege of representing my birthplace and my hometown of Newark, N.J. You might recall, in the 1970s, that the former Mayor of Newark, Kenneth Allen Gibson, stated: "Wherever American cities are going, Newark will get there first." I guess that statement is still valid because Essex County, which Newark is the largest municipality in that county jurisdiction, was targeted

as a high-intensive drug area by the Office of National Drug Policy Control. This designation entitles Essex County to receive additional Federal assistance to strengthen antidrug efforts.

It is evident that a comprehensive, coordinated, cooperative system is needed to succeed in this war on drugs. I am pleased to note that the January 1990 National Drug Control Strategy report points out that New Jersey is one of the four States that have moved aggressively to implementing a serious and comprehensive State plan.

I have become personally involved in a program called Fighting Back. Fighting Back is a privately funded drug initiative, funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and which Newark was selected out of 300 cities that applied for the grant, and through initiatives attempts to reduce the demand of illicit drugs and alcohol is our main thrust. All aspects of our community are participating in this program. For the first time in a long time, I have seen large numbers of individuals put aside self-interest to do what they can. We have seen the State Police come in and work with the city police. We have seen the State Attorney General meet with the attorneys from the city of Newark to talk about a comprehensive program. We are hoping to replicate this, which is the goal, to see if we can reduce the demand and come up with a comprehensive program.

One question, though, that concerns us as expressed by various segments of our community is how will the targeted dollars that were suggested in the five intensity drug areas in the original plan—when will that come into effect and when can we count on the Federal Government to start to implement that part of the overall strategy. So I certainly look forward to hearing the presentation on the status of the strategy at this time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you very much.

Mr. HUGHES. I thank the gentleman.

As I indicated in the opening statement, our first witness is Stanley E. Morris, the Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug Control Policy. He is accompanied by Bruce M. Carnes, who is Director of Planning for Budget and Administration. We welcome you. Mr. Morris is no stranger to this committee and we welcome him once again. Welcome.

We have your prepared text, which, without objection, will be made a part of the statement in full and we hope you can summarize for us.

STATEMENT OF STANLEY E. MORRIS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SUPPLY REDUCTION, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY; ACCOMPANIED BY BRUCE M. CARNES, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF PLANNING, BUDGET AND ADMINISTRATION

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will attempt to do so.

When I came to Capitol Hill a little over 1 year ago for my confirmation hearing, illegal drugs and the tragic consequences of drug abuse had reached into every community, touched every American family, and threatened our society as surely as any enemy in our past. Today, of course, the drug crisis persists, but there are some clear signs of progress. Most of the available statis-

tical evidence is headed, we believe, in the right direction. Our major drug indicators all reveal progress against our drug problems.

For example, cocaine-related emergency room mentions, which since 1985 had been increasing dramatically, finally leveled off in 1989 and then began to decline, dropping 22 percent between October and December. Emergency room mentions for heroin also dropped 14 percent. DEA offices across the country are now reporting that cocaine is somewhat harder to find, somewhat more expensive, and somewhat less pure.

Overseas, coca leaf prices have fallen, and reports are at hand that some coca farmers in Peru and Bolivia are beginning to switch to legal crops. Also important are numerous multiton seizures of cocaine by United States and Mexican officials, significantly increasing those seizures over the past few years. During the first 5 months of this year, Mexican officials had already seized twice as much as they had during the same period last year.

It would be a grave mistake to attribute momentum against drugs to a specific policy or a single governmental initiative. No such credit is being claimed here today. The encouraging trends are the cumulative product of individual and collective efforts across our country, from the communities, as Mr. Payne suggested in his remarks, to the States, the Federal Government, and to a commitment internationally.

The prescription for success, we believe, is indeed found in the President's National Drug Control Strategy. The Federal Government is organized today and prepared for and heavily engaged in a long-term offensive against every element of the drug problem. The drug war is being waged on all fronts, and the National Strategy, we believe, outlines a balanced plan of attack, not just for government, but for private industry and all individual Americans. There is no single initiative, there is no single tactic that will address this problem successfully. The Strategy intends to apply pressure every available place tenaciously and over time.

As required by law, the President will transmit, as the chairman said in his opening statement, a third strategy document to Congress early next year. Our goals have remained unchanged: we will work toward reducing the supply and availability of drugs on our streets; we will dismantle trafficking organizations through tough law enforcement and interdiction measures; we will continue to educate and dissuade our citizens away from using drugs; we will place more addicts into effective and greatly expanded treatment programs; we will strengthen the efforts of source countries to stem the violence and economic dislocation caused by the international drug trade. These remain our guiding policies of our Nation's drug effort and will remain the underlying efforts outlined in our strategy to come later this winter.

Coordinating the efforts of law enforcement in the war on drugs producing and trafficking organizations is a critical element of the strategy. Federal law enforcement efforts seek to disrupt and dismantle such organizations through sustained investigations aimed at their leadership, seizing and forfeiting ill-gotten gains, prosecuting those responsible for the drug flow in our country.

The Drug Control Strategy highlights the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Program, concentrating multiple agencies against the threat of organized drug trafficking organizations.

The strategy recognizes that trafficking in certain areas affects the entire Nation. While many cities in the United States are experiencing substantial problems, concerted action in designated areas we believe will benefit the entire Nation. The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program, referenced in Mr. Payne's opening remarks, is one small step in the consolidated national campaign against illegal drugs. This program can contribute to strengthening our criminal justice system efforts at disrupting and weakening trafficking organizations in these areas. We believe it will supplement the already substantial Federal-State-local law enforcement programs aimed at drug trafficking.

The HIDTA initiatives is being coordinated and integrated with ongoing programs to fill some gaps in the existing line of attack and bring a little more balance to the National Drug Strategy. These special funds will bring additional Federal manpower and equipment to an already substantial effort focused on the large-scale trafficking activities of organizations operating in New York, Miami, Houston, Los Angeles, and along the Southwest border. Congress appropriated $25 million in fiscal year 1990 to supplement Federal law enforcement antidrug program efforts in these areas. We estimate in 1990 approximately $860 million has been spent in these areas as a part of other appropriations. Federal law enforcement resources in fiscal year 1991 in the designated areas will be approximately $960 million, if the President's budget is enacted this week. This administration is requesting $50 million of HIDTA resources in fiscal year 1991.

I would like to make a side observation, however, Mr. Chairman, because this program has created great confusion. I see it in a recent request by Chairman Rangel to have the General Accounting Office explore the program. The confusion I think is generated by an expectation that is not written in the law, nor was it ever outlined in the strategy that was promulgated last January.

The law establishing the authority of the Director of ONDCP to designate high-intensity drug trafficking areas is very clear, at least in our minds it is very clear. It says—and this is as Mr. Coughlin said in his opening remarks, in Public Law 100-690, which was finally signed on November 18, 1988. The law specifically requests—permits the Director of ONDCP to designate certain areas. There is no funding or authorization implicit in the statute. Let me just point out what the law asks the Director to consider in his designation.

First, the extent to which the area is a center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation or distribution.

Second, the extent to which State and local law enforcement agencies have committed resources to respond to the drug trafficking problem in the area.

Third, the extent to which drug-related activities in the area are having a harmful impact in other areas of the country.

Fourth, the extent to which a significant increase in allocation of Federal resources is necessary to respond adequately to drug-related activities.

I outline that because in the Strategy that the President promulgated in January he pointed out, on page 93—let me quote from this:

> The Congress appropriated $25 million for fiscal year 1990 for use in high-intensity drug trafficking areas and the Administration is seeking to double the amount for the following year. These funds will be provided to Federal law enforcement agencies to increase their efforts targeted against drug trafficking organizations.

This is, in our view, the intent of that designation. Unfortunately, the expectation by communities across the country that this was going to deal with education and treatment, and there is nothing in the statute that would give such an indication. It was nothing in the designation. Indeed, the drug abuse problems in Detroit and Philadelphia and Washington and Chicago are every bit as significant as they are in Miami, New York, Houston, and Los Angeles. We picked these areas because they are organization centers for drug trafficking. This is a law enforcement initiative. I think it is very important to make that point because I think it has not been fully understood on the Hill and it has not been fully understood by local law enforcement.

Second, this is a Federal initiative. There is some concern that funds are not flowing to State and local law enforcement. That is correct. That is not our intention. It was not our intention in the Strategy.

I wanted to make that clear here at the outset in my opening remarks because, as I say, there has been much confusion. We think we have tried to be clear but, obviously, we have not been successful because many people have had expectations that we have not been able to meet.

The strategy also recognizes the significant threat to our public lands, which equal about one-third of our Nation's land mass. One-fourth of the marijuana available for consumption in the United States is grown domestically, much of it in our national parks and forests. Indeed, the United States today is the second largest marijuana producer in the world.

We are a source country, no different in my mind than Peru, Bolivia, Burma, and other countries around the world. Consequently, we have a special obligation. The collective efforts of the Federal land management agencies along with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities and the National Guard and military forces will maintain our public lands for their intended purpose.

Several major marijuana eradication and drug suppression operations have enjoyed success. Over $500 million of high-grade marijuana was eradicated in a Federal, State, and local National Guard operation in the Daniel Boone National Forest in southern Kentucky, and you will see in a few weeks, I think, a major success farther West in a major Western State of comparable numbers.

Not all elements of the Strategy, however, are proceeding smoothly. In our second Drug Control Strategy, the President called for a significant new project, the National Drug Intelligence Center. This center is intended to bring together the intelligence capabilities of all Federal law enforcement agencies to construct a detailed picture of the trafficking organizations we are trying to destroy. Vulnerabilities must be identified and understood before

they can be fully exploited. We need to fight this war smarter. Much of the information we need for this task is already collected. It is collected in the files and differing data bases of the FBI, DEA, Customs, ATF, Marshals, INS, EPIC, and on and on. The center as to connect these information pieces, to analyze them and to develop ways to exploit the organizations' vulnerabilities that help us apply our resources more effectively.

After favorable action in the House, all current indications are that the Senate will not support the Drug Intelligence Center. Director Bennett asked, indeed pleaded with the Senate Judiciary Committee during his testimony on September 6 to help prevent this unfavorable action. Congress generally has been a helpful partner in drug policy and we hope that we can sustain that commitment and further support this important new center.

I will close here. As I said in my opening, we have made some progress. We believe we have a good plan. We have agreement, we believe, on a fundamental approach to fighting the drug problem. We agree on tough law enforcement. We agree on the need to work with source and transit countries. We agree on expanded use of the military, expanded drug intelligence, more research. We agree on expanding treatment and making treatment more accountable. Finally, we agree on improved and focused efforts at prevention and education dealing with this demand problem that is so serious in our Nation. Some progress has been made. Much remains to be done.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. Morris appears on p. 31.]

Mr. HUGHES. Thank you very much, Mr. Morris. Let me just pick up on a couple of things that you have mentioned.

The National Drug Control Strategy envisions a new National Drug Intelligence Center. That was your last comment. Refresh my recollection. Who do you propose to be the lead agency?

Mr. MORRIS. Department of Justice.

Mr. HUGHES. Department of Justice. We have seen a proliferation of intelligence gathering in particular in the last few years. Now the Central Intelligence Agency, you know, is implementing a new clearinghouse for their intelligence data.

Our experience has been over the years that as Customs developed its intelligence gathering center it didn't do a very good job of sharing that information. We have seen a proliferation of turf battles in the intelligence area like we have seen in enforcement. Yet, we continue as a government to encourage the proliferation of new centers.

Since the Drug Enforcement Administration is still the lead agency on drug enforcement, although that is often called into question, why don't we build upon the El Paso Center which has always been supported by all of the agencies? We have had Customs and Coast Guard personnel there. DEA is the lead agency, but we have had military personnel assigned to El Paso. Why was that center not chosen as the facility to build upon?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, the El Paso Intelligence Center, which I had something to do with, about 18 years ago, creating and defining what it has attempted to do, has a somewhat narrower focus. We do, indeed, believe that the EPIC—El Paso Intelligence Center—

needs to be strengthened and it needs to be expanded. The reality is, however, that the drug problem, the drug law enforcement problem is so pervasive that almost every agency collects certain information for their own purposes, for their own needs, and not just the basic ones. The Drug Enforcement Administration is the lead agency. Customs has always played a significant role. But increasingly you see agencies that you would not normally think of as having significant data bases. The Bureau of Prisons, for example, collects a lot of information on prison gangs and prison problems that are of great value in providing new elements to understanding drug trafficking organizations. They, of course, have many major drug traffickers within them.

Mr. HUGHES. We know that. But you haven't answered my question, which is—I realize that the focus of El Paso is not as broad as we want, but does it have all the basic ingredients, for a very good clearinghouse for both strategic and tactical intelligence?

Let's face it. The problem is that Customs doesn't want DEA to be the lead. FBI doesn't want DEA to be the lead. Once again we are bogged down with turf battles, so what we do is we create a new center of which Justice is the lead. It seems to me we keep reinventing the wheel to deal with what should be a very simple matter of Justice saying: DEA is going to be the lead. DEA is still the lead agency in drug enforcement, it will collect and collate information that comes in from the Bureau of Prisons and Customs and Coast Guard and all of the other—CIA now—all of the other agencies that are collecting tactical and strategic intelligence.

Mr. MORRIS. Well, the plan, I believe, is being evolved as we speak at the Department of Justice. The DEA would play a preeminent role, though not exclusive, along with the FBI, INS, Customs, ATF, and other agencies. We need a central center with the resources necessary to fuse the various databases together, and we continue to think that centralizing that function—not as a collector of intelligence—is not a problem. We know a lot. The problem is we don't put it together, analyze it, and make it useful.

Mr. HUGHES. Part of the problem is that we have all these agencies collecting intelligence and it is their information and they don't share it. We knew that when we developed these other centers.

Let me just move on. My time is limited. You know, that is a part of the problem. You know it is a part of the problem.

The second thing, we have a——

Mr. OXLEY. Would you yield on that?

Mr. HUGHES. Yes; I would be happy to yield.

Mr. OXLEY. I would just like to inquire. Part of the problem appears to be just jurisdictional. Is also a part of the problem, at least in the Senate, the resources, the money?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, that is always a part of the problem. But I think that there is, and we have not been successful in persuading particularly Senator Hollings that this is not duplicative. It is not duplicative. This is an effort that does not exist at present.

But, at any rate, Dr. Carnes has been more actively involved in the budget negotiations.

Mr. CARNES. The amount of funds that we have asked for for 1991, in my view, is not a significant impediment to the enactment

of this center. I believe there are other reasons, to which I am not privy, that are driving some of the considerations in the Senate committee.

Just two quick comments to respond to Mr. Hughes. We think we have cracked the problem of interagency sharing, and we think we did this by crafting that center.

Mr. HUGHES. You are a miracle worker. Why don't you come up here on the Hill and help us with the budget.

Mr. CARNES. I will confirm to you that it was not easy. It took a long time to do it. The product is analogous to what CIA does, only for law enforcement. The problem with the databases and as they are currently analyzed by law enforcement agencies is that they are essentially pointed towards one thing: arrest and prosecution, and information that does not lead to that is not relevant. I am oversimplifying.

We need to apply the kinds of analytic skills that transcend that to the data that already exists. We also need, we think, to do it here so that it can guide and shape planning. It is not to be tactical. It is not to be operational. It is not to assist in busts. It is to assist in knowing exactly how this creature breathes, so that all these agencies, and I don't mean just law enforcement agencies, can apply their own resources and skills.

For instance, you could discern—without prosecuting anybody, arresting anybody, incarcerating anybody—that you needed to change regulations or you needed to change laws. That is a completely different way of approaching the problem than the classical law enforcement way, or at least the way EPIC and many of these other law enforcement intelligence centers are pointed. They are pointed towards arrest and prosecution. We are talking about a whole range of things beyond that.

Mr. HUGHES. Well, Doctor, I think you have worked to try to bring about coordination and eliminate some of the duplication, and I salute your effort. But I don't get the same reading as you are getting relative to agency turf battles. I mean, I talk to agency heads about some of the overlap, and we continue to exacerbate the problem. We want to assign Secret Service to some of the work, and that just exacerbates the problem.

But let me just move on, as my time is up. One of the problems I have with our strategy is that the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force operations have been very successful, and we should have expanded those operations years ago. They leverage Federal expertise with State and local law enforcement initiatives, we maximize our effort, and everybody talks to one another. The Feds talk to the locals, the locals talk to the State, which doesn't always happen, and it has worked. It has been very, very successful. Part of our problem with the high intensity drug trafficking designations is there the locals feel that they have been left out once again.

Now it was always my intent—I don't know about the intent of others on this committee and other legislative committees—that we utilize the mechanism of organized crime drug enforcement task forces. It is a success story. We continue to operate without the expansion we need there. Frankly, why is it that we don't do that? Is there a simple reason, or is it more complex?

Mr. MORRIS. Well, no. I don't think it is very complex. I share your views, and indeed I have spoken with the Deputy Attorney General about this. Because when we proceeded to organize how to handle this program, we basically directed the Treasury Department to deal with the Southwest border and the Department of Justice to deal with the four metropolitan areas. They did not, I believe, effectively integrate OCDE Task Forces into the planning process, and I think perhaps it was because of—well, I won't conjecture. I think quite honestly it was a mistake in terms of the planning process and I don't think we will repeat that in fiscal year 1991.

Mr. HUGHES. Well, I tell you I am a little discouraged. In addition to being on this committee I chair the Crime Subcommittee and I authorize DEA's budget. We attempt to put more money in every year for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force and for the Foreign Cooperative Investigative Program, the overseas programs, and for diversion, which is a very serious problem in this country, you know. Probably more serious, if you want to look at the overdose rates in hospitals and clinics around the country. Yet every year we don't carry out those priorities. The moneys are reprogrammed. Why?

Mr. CARNES. Well, the administration requested a 54-percent increase in OCDETF for 1991.

Mr. HUGHES. I increased that, as a matter of fact, in the authorizing process.

Mr. CARNES. It would move from 195 in 1989 to 215 in 1990. There is 330 in 1991.

Mr. HUGHES. But in the past. I am talking about in the past.

Mr. CARNES. Oh, in the past.

Mr. HUGHES. We have seen no expansion and I don't for the life of me understand why. I think that is central to some of the problems we are developing in the high-intensity drug-trafficking areas because we are not seeing the kind of cooperation we should be seeing with State and local entities which is essential to any strategy.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just change gears a little bit here for a moment.

Recently, our staff visited the Federal correctional institution in Petersburg, VA. We were struck by the intensive educational and vocational programs available to facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration of the inmates into the society. I think the need for these programs is becoming more apparent and more important within the Federal prison system due to the exploding population as well as the higher incidence of drug-related crime.

Could you comment on the extent to which these kinds of programs do exist within the State prison system?

Mr. MORRIS. In terms of work programs, there have been a number of impediments which have hampered the ability of prisons to effectively sell the product of prison labor. I think that has been a serious problem. We are looking at that as part of the strategy preformulation. We think that there are a number of benefits by having effective programs like that within the prison that you saw in Petersburg.

The first benefit, of course, is that, not different than anywhere else, idle hands and idle minds create significant management problems and, in prisons, to the extent that you can keep people actively engaged, you can keep—you can more efficiently and effectively manage the population.

Second, we believe that we ought to be able to use the resource—our over 750,000 men and women in prisons—that is an incredible potential work force to assist us in carrying out various needs. We, at present, send U.S. products to Mexico and Korea and the Caribbean and elsewhere to have Third World countries do labor. I question why, in fact, we don't use our own prison capacity to do that, to fix those problems and help pay for the——

Mr. COUGHLIN. The programs I saw in Petersburg appeared to be very good programs. My question is—as you look around the country—how common are these in other prisons?

Mr. MORRIS. They are not common enough.

Mr. COUGHLIN. What can we do to make them more common?

Mr. MORRIS. What I think we need to do is we need to change laws that permit the sale of prison products so that we can fund those programs within the institution. At present, they cost almost as much money as they are worth because the value of the products, the work products, and the related efforts can't be sold on the streets.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Have you made proposals for changing policy?

Mr. MORRIS. We are looking at that as a part of Strategy Three.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Most States have responded aggressively to the prison overcrowding problem by increasing annual expenditures on corrections. Census data show that spending per capita increased 63 percent between 1985 and 1988. It is my understanding that some States are exploring the feasibility of utilizing privately operated jails and prisons.

In your view, how successful have States been in working with the private sector to provide innovative housing options for the offender population?

Mr. MORRIS. It varies from State to State. I took a trip down to a number of institutions in Texas where they have private sector-run prisons and jails and was quite impressed at the quality of the institutions.

Governor Clements has made a major effort to try to increase the capacity in Texas and to try to do it as inexpensively as possible. They have found that the private sector, at least in experience to date, don't have any long-term experience, but in experience to date, the private sector can amortize their capital costs over periods of time and with certain tax arrangements within the State, both make a profit and provide the custodial care cheaper than governmental institutions. Similar efforts are under way in Tennessee.

I think probably it is too soon, however, to determine over time whether this will be successful. We support a range of alternative ways of looking at dealing with this extraordinarily large incarcerated population we have in the United States.

Mr. COUGHLIN. On another subject, what is your view of the Customs Service's effectiveness in interdicting drugs hidden in cargo

containers? Are there any new technologies currently being developed to improve the effectiveness of this?

Mr. MORRIS. We are looking at a series of new technologies that would assist them. Recently, as part of our high-intensity drug-trafficking area at JFK, the Customs Service, using some X-ray technology and some good investigative techniques, found about $6 million hidden in large specially built containers of bull semen that were being sent back to Colombia. So they managed to seize the funds, which were drug-trafficking money, trying to get out of the country.

We primarily use dogs. What we are looking at and have had some series of discussions with Sandia Lab and Jet Propulsion Lab and others around the country to try to improve our technologies in this area. There are some interesting developments that we are looking at that will provide inspectors easier ways to identify some 8 million containers that enter the United States every year. This will be better than the people-intensive way that we are currently doing.

As you know, we have the National Guard providing extra assistance, but still it is much more manpower-intensive than we would like.

Research and development is a very, very high priority of the drug strategy and an area that we are making some progress in in getting major assistance from the national security community, intelligence community and the Department of Defense. We think that we are doing better than we were, but not as good as we will be.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me yield to other members at this time. I have some other questions.

Mr. PAYNE [presiding]. Thank you.

We will hear from the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There was an article, I think, yesterday or maybe the day before in the Washington Post regarding the apparent ascendancy of the Cali cartel over the Medellin cartel. It went on to indicate that because of obvious problems in the Medellin cartel and the fact that their leader is still on the run, that Cali has quietly moved into the forefront in the drug area.

Could you confirm that and if indeed that is the case, what does that mean in terms of our overall effort at interdicting the flow of drugs from South America?

Mr. MORRIS. Our intelligence suggests that the Cali cartel has, in fact, been increasing its percentage of the export of cocaine market. They are a somewhat different organization. However, our investigative efforts, both domestically and our intelligence efforts abroad, have not been exclusively focused on the Medellin cartel. We know quite a lot about the Cali cartel, its practices, its organizational roots in this country, and we think that we are fully prepared to apply the same pressures as effectively against that organization as we have been trying to against the Medellin cartel.

Mr. CARNES. If I could just add one point to that, Mr. Oxley, there is some evidence to indicate that the Cali cartel has always been responsible for a great deal of the cocaine shipped to the United States, maybe even the majority of it. The reason they don't

get a lot of press is because they are not as violent as the Medellin cartel. They just behave and do their business a lot differently.

So they don't get a lot of media attention, certainly not the way that Pablo Escobar and Rodriquez Gacha and others do, but Mr. Morris is absolutely right. Just because they don't get as much press, there is certainly no reason for us not to pay even more attention to them than we do to Medellin. It is as high a priority for us as Medellin is and we are actually targeting, I believe, some efforts to work that problem.

Mr. OXLEY. So it is more a matter of style——

Mr. CARNES. Right——

Mr. OXLEY. And background, the Cali cartel being perhaps more middle-class, business-oriented, as opposed to the Medellin leadership, which had come up the hard way, if you will, car thieves and other sordid low-life.

Mr. CARNES. That is correct.

Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Morris, you testified before the committee in February that out of 1,000 U.S. Customs Agents being cross-designated to the DEA, that 400 agents would be concentrated in the high-intensity drug-trafficking areas. That would include New York City, Los Angeles, Miami, Houston, and the Southwest border.

First of all, has this designation occurred, and if so, could you provide us with a breakdown of how many agents were assigned to each of the five areas and what criteria were used for determining the number of agents?

Mr. MORRIS. Certainly. The cross designation was completed at the end of May, well ahead of schedule. Although we had originally committed to, at a minimum 400, we have since increased that to 755 of the over 1,000. That 755 is broken down as follows: 71 in Houston, 80 in Los Angeles, 153 in Miami, 115 in New York and 336 along the border—essentially, from Harlingen to San Ysidro.

The priorities that were the basis upon which these were done were based on an assessment made locally between Customs and DEA and those recommendations were then made up the line and final determinations were made at DEA headquarters. Every indication we have is that the greater flexibility and investigative powers that DEA has granted to these Customs investigators has enhanced not just our interdiction, but our investigative abilities in these areas by having people with greater flexibility in terms of areas in which they can operate.

Mr. OXLEY. Are you able to quantify that or is it simply at this point a matter of feel?

Mr. MORRIS. I think right now it probably is too soon to give you a firm analysis. As I say, it has only been now about 4 or 5 months that this has been in place, but we can certainly—we will be looking at that and making an assessment of it.

If it weren't working, I would tell you. Good news doesn't flow up to us at the Drug Control Office, but bad news does and I haven't heard anything, so my guess is it is working well.

Mr. OXLEY. We hope so and, obviously, the next time you appear, we will have a little better handle on it and some more information. Hopefully, perhaps, also some quantitative means to determine the effectiveness of that.

I think this could be one of the real success stories in terms of manpower and concentrating that manpower on some high-intensity areas and we look forward to hearing from you again as to how that is working.

Mr. MORRIS. I will make sure, based on your comments, that we have a built-in evaluation component in that if we don't already have it.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

We will now hear from the gentleman from California, Mr. Herger.

Mr. HERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Morris, it is good to have you with us. I represent a district in rural northern California and, as you are probably aware, our drug of choice out in the California area, and probably most of the West, is methamphetamine, and indeed, my rural mountain area is spread throughout with labs.

Could you discuss what our government is doing to overcome that?

Mr. MORRIS. Sure. You are absolutely correct that the methamphetamine problem, which was very, very serious in southern California, has moved up into the Sacramento area. I was out there recently and it is a very, very significant problem.

What we have done at the Federal level, and this is on the order of some good news, is when the Congress enacted the chemical precursor legislation, it was focusing on trying to make it more difficult to acquire the precursor and essential chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamines, as well as trying to put controls on the export of precursor and essential chemicals abroad which are essential in the manufacture of cocaine.

The domestic part of this is that it has made it more difficult and as a consequence, meth lab seizures nationwide are down about 40 percent and, given the priority we are putting on this, it suggests to us that there are fewer mom and pop operations because it is more difficult to get the chemicals.

So, we think we are having some effect as a result of that. If it continues to be a significant problem, what we probably will do, typically, is when you have some effect on the ease in which one gets into a market, you create larger organizations and that will change our investigative strategy a little bit.

But generally, we think that the legislation that Congress enacted has been aggressively enforced and is having some positive effects.

Mr. HERGER. Could you tell me to what degree our policies and our upcoming antidrug strategy will continue to fight the methamphetamine problem?

Mr. MORRIS. We are, as you know Mr. Herger, in the process of formulating that strategy. I can't be to specific in terms of our current thinking. I can only say that we feel very strongly, because you have another problem up there in northern California, in addition to methamphetamines, marijuana.

Mr. HERGER. I was just going to follow up on that.

Mr. MORRIS. They grow the highest-quality marijuana in the world today, not something that we should take pride in. The sinsemilla plant that we have hybridized is a serious drug and has serious health consequences and serious social consequences. We are very concerned about it. But beyond that, we are going to be credible in meeting and discussing efforts by the Peruvians, Bolivians, Colombians, and other countries around the world like Pakistan and Burma. Their drug activities make them primary source countries. The United States has to recognize that for at least two drugs, marijuana and methamphetamines, we are a significant source country ourselves.

When Dr. Bennett and the President returned from Cartagena they made it very clear to us that these had to be high priorities. If we are going to ask other people to take tough action, then we need to do that here in the United States.

As a consequence, unknown to most people, we are at present using aerial eradication techniques in Hawaii, using pesticides that kill the marijuana plant much more efficiently; essentially, what we are asking Bolivians and Peruvians and Mexicans and others to do. I think that is very important.

We have people from our U.S. Information Agency out there filming and looking at our efforts so that we can, in fact, explain that we are prepared to take these kinds of actions where we have a problem and we ask other people to do the same.

Mr. HERGER. I thank you for that. I am looking forward to working with you very closely on both of these very severe problems that we have in our area in the future and I thank you for your comment.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

Mr. PAYNE. The gentleman from Texas.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Nice to see you again.

As you well know, I represent a district that borders Mexico. The January strategy designated the Southwest border as a high-intensity drug-trafficking area, yet border patrolmen, our first line of defense against drug trafficking in this region, complain about the lack of proper equipment and pay hikes and they are put at the bottom of all Federal law enforcement organizations. These men face increased illegal immigration, drug smuggling, and rising violence directed at them along with severe staffing shortages.

What is being done to address all those problems?

Mr. MORRIS. The Border Patrol has been historically and unfortunately, kind of at the back of the law enforcement community. When I was Director of the U.S. Marshals Service, we ended up recruiting a lot of Border Patrol people because of their salary structure.

I met just last week with the new Associate Commissioner for Enforcement at INS and talked about this specific problem. We have taken some of the resources, high-intensity drug traffic resources, and provided them to the Border Patrol for equipment. We have, in fact, provided military equipment. Joint Task Force 6, out of Fort Bliss, in El Paso, has been working with INS and the Border Patrol and the military found a renewed respect for the tough job the Border Patrol does and have providing them equip-

ment and support and the National Guard is providing additional assistance to them as well.

But I will tell you that I believe that we need to do better in basically salary and benefits for the Border Patrol and for Federal law enforcement generally, which have fallen behind State and local law enforcement in many cases. That is something the administration is concerned about.

At a lunch that a number of the law enforcement agencies had with the President a few months ago, this issue was probably the primary one that was discussed, how do we attract, retain the very best people? That is a very important matter to all of us.

The Border Patrol plays a critical role, as do the Customs Inspectors, DEA and the like.

Mr. ORTIZ. In response to the question that you answered a few moments ago, now that we are a source nation, has this affected our manpower?

Has that created a shortage, because we are having to bring people back from the border areas because we have some other areas throughout the nation that are in dire need of help?

Mr. MORRIS. Of course, we are in need of manpower and we have been increasing resources. Of course, we are still awaiting final action on the part of the Congress for our appropriation for fiscal year 1991, which is, of course, the first full year of the budget for the drug strategy.

We are, however, taking some steps that do not require additional resources, but simply an application of existing resources toward this problem. Specifically, the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, law enforcement officers are spending much higher percentages of their time and attention on public lands dealing with, as Mr. Herger says, meth labs, marijuana eradication. We have used both the regular Army, as well as National Guard, very aggressively on public lands in eradication.

Dr. Bennett and I were in Boone County, KY, a few weeks ago, where we saw numerous helicopters, the National Guard, chopping down hundreds of thousands of large cultivated marijuana plants. For them, it is good training and they are making a contribution to a domestic war and so we have not had to take people away from the border to deal with these problems, but simply tried to enhance all of our efforts to focus on this. That was why the Office of National Drug Control Policy was created.

Mr. CARNES. I could just give you a couple of numbers for you, Mr. Ortiz. In 1989, when the Bush administration took office, there were about 41,000 people, Federal officials, involved in the drug war, and that includes not only law enforcement individuals, but also those involved in running education programs, treatment programs.

The 1991 President's budget request would increase the number to 54,000 people and that is exclusive of the manpower resources of the Department of Defense for the activities that Mr. Morris was just now talking about. So there is a very, very large increase in manpower beyond which there is yet another one because of the involvement of DOD.

Mr. ORTIZ. Very good.

I want to continue to believe that we are winning the war against drugs. Sometime back, I was very encouraged when President Bush said that it looks like there is a clear sign of progress, but then I hear about Mexican officials who have seized twice as much as they had during the same period in 1989 and then we see more truckloads of heroin, marijuana, and cocaine coming in across the borders.

What is happening?

Mr. MORRIS. We are seizing more. We are never going to seize everything. I think you would be unrealistic to expect that we will. As long as we have a demand and market and money, people are going to find ways to penetrate our efforts at interdicting it. What we do see in the area of cocaine is a clear indication that there is less of it available within the United States now than there was 2 years ago.

These are seizure efforts by the Mexican Government and seizure efforts in the United States. There was a significant one in Arizona just yesterday, which I had a press release on. It was about 680 kilos as the result of an investigation. We are getting assistance, it was a DEA/Customs Service and the Tahona Odom National Police Department, so that we are getting assistance even from the Indian police in these areas.

We have a much more effective, mobilized effort. You will see the seizure numbers going up. You are going to continue to see cocaine on the streets and you will see, I think, in the near term, greater amounts available at probably lower prices than heroin because of the extraordinary growing that has been going on, particularly in Southeast Asia.

But fundamental to our strategy is pressure at every possible place tenaciously applied over time and we are going to win this finally—everybody agrees—when we persuade our young and our people that drugs are antithetical to us as a society. But in the meantime, we are going to take all the other steps as well.

Mr. ORTIZ. Just one last question. I don't want to take up too much time, but Dr. William Bennett has stated before that education is not the key to keeping our children off drugs. He said that we should have more aggressive law enforcement and stiffer penalties. Working on our strategy, wouldn't it be wise for Dr. Bennett and Dr. Lauro Cavazos, the Secretary of Education, to better coordinate their efforts? I am a great believer in the strength of education and I think that education is an important resource in winning the war on drugs.

Mr. MORRIS. In fairness, and of course, Dr. Carnes has worked at the Department of Education and this is not my area and he is probably pulling my coat now, but what Dr. Bennett has said is that education, classic nature of education, which is the imparting of knowledge, is not the panacea, that the problem is not for our young simply that they need to know about drugs. Indeed, kids today know a lot about drugs. What he is saying is that education needs to deal with areas that are untraditional; that is, you need not simply to have knowledge about drugs, you also must have some consequences, some clear policies within the schools that are against drugs, that it is not simply the imparting of knowledge.

That is what he means when he said education, in the classic sense.

However, I think that he would agree and, of course, in his years as Secretary of Education, that the education community, if mobilized, can be a very effective ally here. What I hear, quite honestly—and I will it over to Dr. Carnes, is that you go around and you talk to communities. You ask the people in the communities, who is really joined in in trying to deal with the drug problem here, and they will tell you that the business community is very concerned about it, the law enforcement community is very concerned about it and they would kind of give you a list, but community after community, the most recalcitrant group of people who are sort of the least willing to join into the drug war is the education community.

They find it the most difficult and, of course, they are having challenges simply in imparting knowledge to improving SAT scores, trying to impose upon education new kinds of skill requirements that many teachers feel are very difficult to deal with.

So I think that that is closer to what Dr. Bennett is saying, but I will defer to Bruce Carnes here.

Mr. CARNES. Again, Mr. Ortiz, if I can, I will rattle off a couple of numbers here. If you will concede that by education, we generally mean prevention; that is to say, prevention activities, teaching people, instructing them, urging them not to take drugs, obviously more than just the U.S. Department of Education is involved in that. Several Federal agencies are involved in prevention messages. HHS, HUD, a whole group of agencies.

Yet the numbers, then, are that when the Bush administration took office, that number was $677 million. In the President's request that is pending before Congress, it is $1.25 billion for prevention activities. That is an 83-percent increase for that activity. That is a very significant commitment, I think, by the administration, to prevention-, education-type activities.

As to what those activities should be, we felt very strongly—President Bush asked for only two new things, two new things that didn't already exist. He plused up everything else. He asked for two new things. One was the National Drug Intelligence Center, about which we were speaking at the beginning of this hearing, through it looks like the Senate is not going to let us have. The second was community partnership grants funded through the Department of Health and Human Services, a brand new initiative. It is a $100 million grant program capitalizing on what Mr. Payne was talking about in the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation program. It is modeled exactly like that because that program is an outstanding program and, unfortunately, they don't have enough money. So we want to do exactly that thing, to bring those communities together to accomplish just what that project is doing. We did get that.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PAYNE. Just taking that one step further, I think that the reason that there has been so much comment regarding Dr. Bennett's statement is that very rarely has there been talk about what does not work. I mean, we know, number one, that we are some-

what losing the war at the present time, but we are going to win it. We still are talking about research. We are still talking about more judges and a better criminal justice system and more prisons and more drug treatment centers and so forth, but I think just about every meeting I have been at, I think Dr. Bennett, if he is not known for anything else, when he leaves, he will be known for the one who said he didn't think education works. As you explain it and you go through what he really meant, I think that 99-percent of the public will never hear that and I think that the rationale that you set forth perhaps in context with what he said makes maybe a little bit more sense than he said at that time, but this is—there is an impression, at least in my community, that Dr. Bennett said, "Well, forget education. Let's just build more jails," and that is a difficult thing to overcome.

Just wondering about—and I know your job is trying to eradicate the drug problem, but say if we are able to even educate and keep a person from getting involved again, going back to a drug problem or—and some of those things—is there anything in your program that deals with the obstacles that prevent people from going back to drugs, such as the lack of employment and homelessness and the lack of job skills or education?

I mean, that has to come into the mix somewhere down the line, hopefully sooner than later, but is there any kind of discussion in your agency about the social side that creates a lot of this problem?

Mr. MORRIS. We do have quite open, active and heated discussions about issues like that. The problem that we constantly come up against is people talk about root causes and we can't figure out what they are. Quite honestly, we have—my counterpart on the demand side is a psychiatrist, a distinguished psychiatrist from Yale University, who ran early on one of the first heroin treatment programs in New Haven. He's a very distinguished scholar and we have, of course, Reggie Walton, who is the Associate Director who has been, as Chairman Hughes said, to almost every city in the country talking with almost every person who wants to talk and is prepared to listen. We pull and hem and haw on those issues.

The fact is, Mr. Payne, that we don't know. We see people with jobs and who have money who are drug users. We see people who are poor who are not. We see people who go to church every day who are drug users and people who never go to church who are not. Quite honestly, if one area makes us create some degree of humility, it is this one area. What we are trying to do in our Drug Strategy is essentially deal with what we can understand, which is you have to make sure that our streets are safe for innocent citizens and that the drug traffickers don't take them over.

We need to make sure that our schools are drug-free, that the kids have an opportunity for education. We need to protect our borders. We need to work with the countries abroad. We need to do everything we can to treat those who are willing to be treated and we need to work and look and explore ways of prevention.

But the dealing with the question of employment or housing or disenfranchised citizens in so many of our inner cities is something we simply don't have the answer to and so we are concentrating on at least what we think we know we can do.

Mr. PAYNE. I just have a couple of very quick questions. for the committee. You may recall, I did not—I forewent my questioning period and since members continue to come in, let me get them out before the bell rings.

In regard to that high-intensity drug area, we indicated that we have heard from the Southwest border—I mentioned it earlier, were there ever any meetings with the law enforcement people in those areas? You indicated another unfortunate situation was that these areas felt that because they were designated, there would be additional funds going to State and local governments, law enforcement governments.

I read the report, too, and I am one of those who sort of just read into it that there would be some additional revenue for these areas, but evidently you are making it clear that there is none.

Have you met with the local people, and second, is there going to be any follow-up with the local people? Even if there are no dollars flowing, will there be a cooperative effort or why, then, designate these areas?

Mr. MORRIS. I guess there are several questions in that and let me see if I can take them apart.

First of all, the process. I personally, because of the concern I had in trying to make this clear, and obviously I didn't do a very good job, but I went personally to each of the areas and called, not just the Federal agencies together, but senior local law enforcement officers together. In New York, I met with Lee Brown, and in Houston, I met with Mayor Whitmire, as well as with her new Police Chief, and similarly, in Miami, and explained to them what we were trying to do. At least I thought I had tried to explain to them.

But the reason that there is some confusion is that that's what we intend to do with these additional resources—the $25 and $50 million. But because these are high intensity drug trafficking areas we have asked for special attention to be given to them, for example, in the discretionary grant programs of the Bureau of Justice Assistance.

We have asked the other law enforcement agencies to pay special attention to these areas because of their significant importance to the Nation as a whole. If we can effectively impede drug organizations in New York, on the Southwest border or Houston or Miami, we can positively influence the drug problem within the United States. That was the concept. We did meet with them, as I said.

I think that we need to continue to meet with them. There is, however, because as I've had this similar hearing with the Appropriations Committees—particularly the Senate Appropriations Committee—and my understanding is currently that there are plans to, in addition to the $50 million that the administration sought to deal with increasing the Federal effort, $32 million that they will be asking us to apply to the local, State and local law enforcement. That, basically, carries the day that in fact there will be resources available—additional resources—in those funds.

Is that responsive, Mr. Payne?

Mr. PAYNE. Partially, yes.

Just the last thing: There's been a 100-percent increase in the cost of methadone—and I know that you're in law enforcement, but

your division sort of oversees the question of methadone maintenance. I have some questions about that but I'll wait for the second part on that if we have the opportunity.

But I just wonder, was there any concern from your unit, and did you talk to the supply sense—the U.S. Government is almost a sole source supplier.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, Dr. Kleber was in fact quite concerned about that, and we have asked the Drug Enforcement Administration to look into those cost increases because essentially have produced this company who has a monopoly and, therefore, DEA needs to make sure that there are not unreasonable profits being made here.

We were concerned about it; DEA was concerned about it; but I haven't seen a response yet to that inquiry.

Mr. PAYNE. Do you know anything further on that?

Mr. CARNES. No; but Mr. Morris is absolutely right, it was a matter of serious concern to us.

Mr. PAYNE. All right, the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Mfume.

Mr. MFUME. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for arriving late. I was involved with the proceedings on the floor. I do have an opening statement that I would ask unanimous consent be entered into the record of the proceedings today.

[The statement of Mr. Mfume apears on p. 38.]

Mr. MFUME. While I don't, for fear of duplication, want to pursue a line of questions that I had come here to ask, I'd also like unanimous consent, if I could, Mr. Chairman, to be able to submit those detailed questions to Mr. Morris and to Mr. Bennett respectfully.

[The information appears on p. 41.]

Mr. MFUME. I would like to take the short time that I have, Mr. Morris, to go back to your statement as it related to root causes, and I have to admit I'm a little shocked that you have no idea what the root causes might be. You gave the example, I think, of some people go to church and they use drugs, and some people don't go to church and they use drugs. Implicit in that, if I could extend it on my own—and this is taking my own license—is that some people may be educated and they use drugs, and some people may not be educated and they use drugs. But I think that in those instances we are probably talking about casual drug users—go to church on Sunday, get high on Saturday; go to school to work on their law degree during the day and get high on the weekend.

But when we talk about chronic drug use, it seems to me that in most instances, identifiable instances, of chronic drug use, we can also identify accompanying social ills, that if we look at the areas that are most affected by chronic drug use, usually we will find—and correct me if I'm wrong—rather high rates of unemployment; usually we will find poor access to health care, and a number of social ills.

If we accept that premise to be true, then logically, I think, we'd have to say that while we may not know the root causes of drug use and drug abuse, that we certainly have an idea that something is going on because it is existing in the same area, or the same place, or at the same time, as many of these social problems.

I regret that Mr. Bennett isn't here—I would really believe that it would serve all of us better if we're able to admit that maybe

these things are root causes. Maybe if they are not the cause, they are contributing causes; and if so, then maybe we ought to focus some of our effort—if not addressing them, at least acknowledging them, so that others who have additional resources beyond this committee, beyond your organization, can go out and do the same thing. Because I just happen to strongly believe that chronic drug use does not operate in a vacuum. People who are going to church every Sunday are not chronic drug users, and those who may be getting an education and using drugs are not chronic, I think they tend to be the casual users.

Quite frankly, I'd be interested in your response.

Mr. MORRIS. I guess I will posit a lead-in with the same humility that I think I tried to indicate in my observation. I guess the best way to respond to this is kind of an anecdote to a personal situation I was in—I think it was Shreveport, LA—and I was talking about this issue with a gentleman who was a fairly wealthy doctor in the community. I said that if we really look at this problem, my thought was that probably the answer might be that one of the reasons that we've had this drug epidemic deals with the breakdown of the family, and that it had something really perhaps to do with the failure of the family and the parent.

He then proceeded to tell me about his son who was, as you could probably tell by the end of that story, a classic burned out case—both parents at home, wealthy, and all the rest. What was the cause of that?

I felt a renewed sense of humility. You may have a firm sense of what causes this, but quite honestly—of course, it's not my job to have to answer that, or at least be expected to in terms of the job that I was appointed to. But I'll be damned if I know; I don't know what the root cause is.

Mr. MFUME. Then you have no idea of what contributing factors might exist?

Mr. MORRIS. I don't.

Mr. MFUME. Then you wouldn't think that the example that you gave is the exception and not the rule?

Mr. MORRIS. Again, I guess I have the advantage of being an amateur in a positive sense in that regard—it's not my background. But I've looked at this enough over the years and I don't have much assurance that I have any comfort in that. There may be others who have, within the National Drug Control Policy, that have firmer views on this, but as I say, if we could come to some agreement we would certainly include that. There's no lack of will; there's no lack of commitment of the people in the administration, and in particular in the office in which I work, to try to do something about this problem.

If we thought that there was a few switches out there that if we flipped would help solve this problem, we'd be the first in line to switch them; but we just don't know what they are.

Mr. MFUME. I assure you that we're all amateurs, as much as we'd like to think that time of service on this committee or in a particular agency, or in advocacy groups, qualifies us for some other liking, we really are amateurs.

But I would respectfully submit to the other members of the committee—at least in my estimation—that I think we would go a

lot further—we, meaning this Congress and certainly the administration also—if we were able to admit that maybe there are some key things that tend to reveal themselves over and over enough and with enough frequency that we might be able to suggest, if not to declare, that they are in fact contributing factors and perhaps also ought to warrant a great deal of our time and attention.

Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back my time.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from New York.

Mr. PAXON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. Coughlin, would you like to have an additional time?

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Can I talk for just a moment about Peru where President Fujimori has refused to sign an agreement for military assistance there, and this is a major drug-producing country.

Where are we now in terms of our narcotics cooperation with Peru? You're in charge of the supply side here. This is a pretty vexing problem and I'm very disappointed.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a new government present in Peru. We're going to find ourselves in areas which we believe are setbacks. As you point out, Peru is the major coca producing nation in the world. We're exploring what options we have to try to achieve our end. We are continuing to talk with the government to try to explain better, further, our perception of what the needs are. We're going to continue as I said earlier, to tenaciously stay with our strategy. We're going to have setbacks—that was a setback. But we're going to proceed to continue to work on the problem.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Will we provide law enforcement assistance or economic assistance in view of the refusal?

Mr. MORRIS. We're looking at a range of options at present. We were discouraged by the decision. Exactly what our response is going to be, I think we will wait and come up and brief you and other members of the committee in a private session on this.

Mr. CARNES. I might add just one gloss to that, and that is that there is, of course, assistance that's provided outside of the Andean strategy—economic aid and other kinds of assistance. That is not affected by this issue; so that will continue to go on.

With respect to the agreement that Mr. Fujimori did not sign—obviously he has not signed it yet, and he said he won't sign it. But Mr. Morris is absolutely correct, we have not abandoned hope on this point. He will not get economic aid that is promised in connection with the Andean strategy unless he does sign that agreement. We were ready to provide significant amounts of economic aid in return for efforts on the Peruvian's part. We have not abandoned hope and we have not abandoned discussions. We are continuing to try to work that problem—we haven't given up.

Mr. COUGHLIN. You've got a Presidential certification coming up in March 1991—that's not terribly far away.

Mr. MORRIS. That's right.

Mr. COUGHLIN. How significant a factor would the refusal to sign the agreement be in either certifying or decertifying Peru in 1991?

Mr. MORRIS. It's of significant concern to us but I'll reserve how significant as we go through continued discussions with the Peruvians.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Then can I just ask a couple of questions about Mexico—a question about Mexico.

What has happened to the Mexican request to have Mexican drug agents stationed in key locations in the United States?

Mr. MORRIS. I have not heard the response to that—under the discussions early on and initial responses, and then I've not heard any follow-on.

Mr. CARNES. No, obviously it's a difficult issue. But we will get back to you, if you would like, and provide you the current status of those discussions. But I'm not aware at this time that any concession has been made in that area.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Has President Salinas maintained his commitment to make life miserable for the drug traffickers, as he told us after his inauguration?

Mr. MORRIS. There have been some significant positive efforts in Mexico, as I mentioned in my opening statement, of seizures particularly by the Northern Border Response Team, doubled between last year and this year. I think that the efforts the Mexicans have been making this year are probably a significant contributor to the increase in cocaine prices—reduced availability.

So the answer is yes, that they have made some significant steps.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you very much.

I'll yield back to you, Mr. Chairman, in case you have other questions.

Mr. PAYNE. OK.

Mr. Morris and Dr. Carnes indicated they had about 10 minutes to go about 5 minutes ago.

I wonder if there are any other persons that have a question they would like to ask before we conclude.

I just have a question that is probably not key at this time, but I asked it to another drug official. We are changing constantly our Armed Services and their dependents around the world. Having recently visited Singapore and Malaysia, the penalty there for drug trafficking and even with very small, small quantities is death. A number of people have been put to death, even some Australians, and there is an American now on trial.

My question is, and it's just something maybe for the Department to think in terms of, if in fact there are some renewed interest in U.S. military presence, either bases or repairing, or whatever, with Singapore and Malaysia, are places that are being discussed possibly.

With this kind of a policy, if in fact we bring in service personnel—and they may have some young high school or college age student—we find that they have a serious penalty, have we thought in terms of the implications of our Government having dependents or young service personnel in an area where you have this kind of a strict law? We would question whether we have a right to say, your law is wrong, you should change it. Of course, we wouldn't do that.

But what kind of complications do you see, or have you given it any thought?

Mr. MORRIS. That has not come to my attention—you know, the site selection for moving our Southeast Asian bases——

Mr. PAYNE. I'm not saying they have, either. It's just we didn't have people in Saudi Arabia 4 months ago either.

I'm just saying that things shift in the world. It's like a global village.

Mr. MORRIS. That's a very good point. I will bring it up with the people we interact with at the Defense Department, because it's an issue. Obviously, I suspect that they are paying attention also, and I will bring the issue up with them. But as I said, it has not come to my attention.

Mr. PAYNE. It's really a nonissue; it's just my issue. I just happened to have gone to Singapore and Malaysia, so I just thought—from the west coast, the way that our supplies are getting to Saudi Arabia is through Singapore; now, that's a lot of supplies. We go from New York, we go from the west coast, and they've got to fuel up or change over, or do something somewhere, and it's Singapore and Malaysia.

Reading on the way in by plane—you know, the penalty—I just happened to be reading; I wasn't concerned about it. But it's just something that somebody might possibly think about.

Mr. CARNES. As a general matter, Mr. Chairman, these are separate, sovereign nations. We would no more stand for having our laws changed to accommodate their desires when they wanted to wander around the United States than I suppose they're going to stand for it from us. So I think that is a general matter of foreign policy that is a fact that we have to live with.

Mr. PAYNE. The problem comes in when maybe some officer's child gets picked up. I know we're not talking about trying to change their policy. But it's just something that may never even come to bear as a problem. I figured that you all didn't have enough to think about so I just wanted to throw something else out.

Mr. MORRIS. We have a say for selection for bases.

Mr. PAYNE. We have a vote.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

This meeting will stand adjourned.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. MORRIS. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

PREPARED STATEMENTS

OPENING STATMENT BY THE

HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL
CHAIRMAN

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

HEARING ON

THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: STATUS REPORT

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1990

10:30 AM

OVER ONE YEAR AGO, THE PRESIDENT, IN ADDRESSING THE NATION, TOLD US THAT THE DRUG CRISIS WAS A TOP PRIORITY AND THAT HE WOULD WORK TO SEE TO IT THAT THE STRATEGY PUT TOGETHER BY WILLIAM BENNETT, THE DRUG CONTROL POLICY DIRECTOR, WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

SINCE THAT TIME, THE OFFICIAL DRUG STRATEGY HAS BEEN FOLLOWED UP WITH AN UPDATED VERSION IN JANUARY, 1990.

THE REASON WE ARE HERE TODAY IS TO REVIEW WHERE WE ARE WITH RESPECT TO THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY. OUR NATION AND OUR GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN BURDENED WITH SOME CRITICAL MATTERS IN RECENT MONTHS --- THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO IRAQI AGGRESSION IN THE PERSIAN GULF, THE FALTERING ECONOMY AND THE PURSUIT OF A SOUND BUDGET FOR THE COUNTRY. THESE ISSUES HAVE DOMINATED THE NEWS AND HAVE RELEGATED SOME OTHER CONCERNS TO BACK-SEAT STATUS.

WHILE ALL OF THESE SITUATIONS BEAR CLOSE WATCHING AND MAXIMUM ATTENTION, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CONTINUE TO STRIVE TO MAKE THE DRUG CRISIS A TOP PRIORITY. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE SHORT SHIFT TO THE PROBLEMS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING AND DRUG ABUSE. WE SHOULD NOT PUSH THE DRUG PROBLEM FURTHER ON THE BACK BURNER BECAUSE OF THESE OTHER PRESSING CONCERNS.

ANOTHER REVISION OF THE FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY IS DUE EARLY NEXT YEAR. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING THAT PLAN WHEN RELEASED, BUT I THINK IT IS CRITICAL FOR US TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE THINGS WE HAVE PUT INTO THE STRATEGY TO DATE ARE WORKING EFFECTIVELY. ARE THE TAXPAYERS GETTING A GOOD RETURN ON THE DOLLARS THEY ARE INVESTING IN THE DRUG STRATEGY? ARE THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT, TREATMENT AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS FUNDED BY THE TAXPAYERS THE BEST THEY CAN BE? WHAT ACCOUNTABILITY EXISTS ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL TO ENSURE THEY ARE? IN ADDITION, THE STRATEGIES TO DATE HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE UNDERLYING ROOT CAUSES OF WHY SO MANY AMERICANS FALL PREY TO DRUGS.

THERE IS A WHOLE RANGE OF SITUATIONS, CONDITIONS, EMOTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS THAT LEAD ONE TO FIRST EXPERIMENT WITH AND LATER ABUSE ILLEGAL DRUGS. NO STRATEGY, NO AMOUNT OF MONEY, AND NO NUMBERS OF POLICE, INVESTIGATORS, OR COURT PERSONNEL CAN BEGIN TO BRING THE DRUG CRISIS UNDER CONTROL UNLESS WE FIGURE OUT SPECIFICALLY WHAT IT IS THAT MAKES PEOPLE OPEN TO SUCH A RISKY AND DANGEROUS PROPOSITION.

OUR NATION - ESPECIALLY IN THE INNER CITIES - IS INUNDATED WITH ILLEGAL DRUGS. AN ENTIRE GENERATION OF YOUNG AMERICANS REMAINS HOSTAGE TO THE RAVAGES OF CRACK COCAINE AND OTHER ILLEGAL DRUGS. THE SEVERITY OF THE DRUG CRISIS IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE NATION AND WHY PEOPLE ABUSE DRUGS IN THE FIRST PLACE NEED TO BE REFLECTED IN OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY.

TODAY, WE WILL HEAR FROM MR. STANLEY MORRIS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SUPPLY REDUCTION AT THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY. MR. MORRIS IS HERE REPRESENTING MR. BENNETT TO PROVIDE A STATUS REPORT ON THE STRATEGY FOR OUR COMMITTEE AND FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Washington, D.C. 20500

STATEMENT OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
STANLEY E. MORRIS
BEFORE
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
October 18,1990

Good morning. When I came to Capitol Hill a year ago for my confirmation hearing, illegal drugs and the tragic consequences of drug abuse had reached into every community, touched every American family, and threatened our society as surely as has any enemy in the past. Today the drug crisis persists. But there are some clear signs of progress. Most of the latest available statistical evidence is headed in the right direction. Our major drug indicators (the Household and High School Seniors Surveys; data from the DAWN and DUF programs; the State Department's INCSR; and price and purity indicators from Federal and other law enforcement agencies) all reveal progress against our drug problems.

For example, cocaine-related emergency room mentions, which since 1985 had been increasing dramatically, finally leveled off in 1989 -- and then began to decline, dropping 22 percent between October and December. Emergency room mentions for heroin also dropped 14% in the first three months of this year on top of a

10% drop in the last quarter of last year. DEA offices across the country are reporting that cocaine is now harder to find, more expensive, and less pure. Overseas, coca leaf prices have fallen from $80-90 per hundred pounds in 1989 to about $20-30, which is at or below the generally accepted break even point; and reports are at hand that some coca farmers are switching to legal crops. Also important are the numerous multi-ton seizures of cocaine by both U.S. and Mexican officials. Between October 1989 and June 1990, 43 tons of cocaine were seized in the United States. And during the first five months of 1990, Mexican officials seized twice as much as they had during the same period in 1989. Put together with apparent positive price and purity fluctuations, available evidence suggest a significant disruption in the international and domestic cocaine market.

It would be a grave mistake to attribute momentum against drugs to a specific policy or single government initiative; no such credit is claimed here. The encouraging trends are the cumulative product of individual and collective efforts across our country - and of comparable sacrifice and diligence in foreign lands, as well.

The prescription for success is found in the President's National Drug Control Strategy. The Federal Government is organized, prepared for and heavily engaged in a long term offensive against every element of the drug problem. The war on drugs is being

waged on many fronts. The National Strategy outlines a balanced plan of attack for all levels of government, for private industry, and for all American citizens. There is no single initiative, no one tactic that will solve our drug problems. The Strategy provides an integrated national policy aimed at the complicated array of problems posed by illegal drugs.

As required by law, the President will transmit a third strategy document to Congress early next near. Our goals have remained unchanged: we will work toward reducing the supply and availability of drugs on our streets; we will dismantle trafficking organizations through tough law enforcement and interdiction measures; we will continue to educate and dissuade our citizens away from using drugs; we will place more addicts into effective and greatly expanded treatment programs; and we will strengthen the efforts of source countries to stem the violence and economic dislocation caused by the international drug trade. These remain the guiding policies of our Nation's anti-drug effort.

Coordinating the efforts of law enforcement in the war on drug producing and trafficking organizations is a critical element of the Strategy. Federal law enforcement efforts seek to disrupt and dismantle such organizations through sustained investigations aimed at arresting their leadership, seizing and forfeiting their ill-gotten gains, and resulting in prosecutions of those

principally responsible for the flow of drugs in the United States.

The National Drug Control Strategy highlights the role of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program that draws on the expertise of nine Federal law enforcement agencies and numerous State and local law enforcement offices to coordinate the investigation and prosecution of highly sophisticated and diversified criminal drug-related and money laundering enterprises. OCDETF seeks to target and destroy major drug trafficking organizations by identifying and prosecuting key leadership individuals -- those who organize, direct, finance, and profit from the illegal activities of these organizations.

The Strategy recognizes that drug trafficking in certain areas affects the entire nation. While many cities in the United States are experiencing substantial drug problems, concerted action in designated areas will benefit the entire nation. The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program is one small step in the consolidated national campaign against illegal drugs. This program can contribute to strengthening our criminal justice systems efforts at disrupting and weakening drug trafficking activities and organizations in the areas. It will supplement the already substantial Federal-State-local law enforcement programs aimed at drug trafficking. The HIDTA initiatives will be coordinated and integrated with ongoing programs to fill some

gaps in the existing line of attack and bring a little more balance to the National drug strategy. The HIDTA funds will bring additional Federal manpower and equipment to an already substantial effort focused on the large-scale trafficking activities of organizations operating in New York, Miami, Houston, Los Angeles, and along the Southwest Border area that account for much of the Nations drug supply. The $25 million of HIDTA funds appropriated in Fiscal Year (FY) 1990 supplements existing Federal law enforcement anti-drug program efforts in these areas, estimated at $860 million in FY 1990. Federal law enforcement resources in FY 1991 in the designated areas are estimated to be $960 million. This Administration is requesting $50 million of HIDTA resources in FY 1991.

The Strategy recognizes the significant threat to our public lands which equal about one-third of our Nation's land mass. One-fourth of the marijuana available for consumption in the United States is grown domestically, much of it in our National Parks and Forests. The collective efforts of the Federal land management agencies, along with other Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities, and the National Guard and military forces, will maintain our public lands for their intended purpose. Several major marijuana eradication and drug suppression operations have enjoyed great success. Over one-half billion dollars of high-grade marijuana was eradicated in a cooperative Federal, State, local and National Guard operation in

the Daniel Boone National Forest in southern Kentucky.

Not all elements of the Strategy are proceeding smoothly. In our second Drug Control Strategy, the President called for a significant new project, the National Drug Intelligence Center. This center is intended to bring together the intelligence capabilities of all Federal law enforcement agencies and construct a detailed picture of the trafficking organizations we are trying to destroy. Vulnerabilities must be identified and understood before they can be fully exploited. Much of the information we need for this task is already collected in the files and data bases of the FBI, DEA, Customs, INS, ATF, and EPIC. The center was to connect these information pieces, analyze them, and develop ways to exploit vulnerabilities as they appear. After favorable action in the House, all current indications are that the Senate will not support the NDIC. Director William J. Bennett asked the Senate Judiciary Committee during his testimony on September 6, 1990, to help prevent the unfavorable action. Congress generally has been a helpful partner in drug policy, and can sustain the commitment of the Federal Government by supporting the NDIC.

I will close where I began. We have made progress. We have a good plan. We have agreement on a fundamental approach to fighting drugs. We agree on tough law enforcement. We agree on the need to work with source and transit countries. We agree on expanded use of the military, expanded drug intelligence, and more research. We agree on expanding treatment and making treatment more accountable. And we agree on improved and focused efforts at prevention and education. Some progress has been made, but much is left to do.

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Small Business
Education & Labor
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REMARKS

Honorable Kweisi Mfume
Select Committee on Narcotics
October 18, 1990

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing as the review of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy is timely. Through the information put forth in this hearing, we can hopefully distinguish the effectiveness of the current drug policy, highlighting the gains toward controlling the drug epidemic while identifying inconsistencies in the policy that impede progress toward that goal.

We as a nation cannot decisively work toward eliminating the destruction of drug trafficking and consumption if the "blue print" for eradicating drugs is not comprehensive and sophisticated. We must be sure to keep ahead of major the players in this deadly struggle--the drug traffickers--both in the U.S. and on the international scene as they become more malicious and elusive in peddling their fatal wares.

MFUME

The blight of drugs continues to devastate America's largest cities as well as every nature of community in this nation permeating all social and economic lines of demarkation. The drug scourge is so advanced it is barely distinguishable from a gangrenous limp left untreated. The National Drug Control Strategy seems to be a slow acting.

I don't think I can stress enough that America must remain strong in its battle against the scourge of drugs that continues in its path of destruction, weakening America from the inside out. Every front must be protected, the waterways and the highways; the school yards and the work place.

Mr. Chairman, time is running out as the drug trade seemingly gains ground. The health and well-being, indeed the viability of America literally hinges on our ability to arrest the devastation of drugs. I for one would like to see our drug policy develop into one which is a viable solution to the havoc and destruction of drugs.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Question. The fundamental principle of the National Drug Strategy remains to reduce drug use through a mix of supply and demand policies. Yet, in my view, there is no identifiable, cohesive national drug policy being utilized that has had a significant effect on decreasing the influx of narcotics into this country or on impeding the demand and consumption of illicit drugs. In fact, the scourge of drugs has pressed beyond the stereotypical "inner city drug market" and has unfortunately become quite pervasive in far too many communities. What fundamental adjustments to the drug policy have been made in light of this?

Answer. The President's National Drug Control Strategy offers the prescription for success. The Federal Government is organized, prepared for and heavily engaged in a long term offensive against every element of the drug problem. The war on drugs is being waged on many fronts. The National Strategy outlines a balanced plan of attack for all levels of government, for private industry, and for all American citizens. There is no single initiative, no one tactic that will solve our drug problems. The Strategy provides an integrated national policy aimed at the complicated array of problems posed by illegal drugs.

Question. The National Drug Control Strategy includes increasing the scope of the criminal justice system, expanding drug treatment programs, as well as education initiatives. However, it has become clear that these approaches are inadequate in ameliorating the current drug crisis. Of the areas that your office has chosen to focus on, which in your view has produced the most noticeable effect? Which combination of efforts has at least begun to move the U.S. toward the final goals of the drug control strategy?

Answer. The momentum against drugs is the cumulative product of our National Drug Control Strategy goals which have remained unchanged: we are working toward reducing the supply and availability of drugs on our streets; we are dismantling trafficking organizations through tough law enforcement and interdiction measures; we are educating and dissuading our citizens away from using drugs; we are placing more addicts into effective and greatly expanded treatment programs; and we are strengthening the efforts of source countries to stem the violence and economic dislocation caused by the international drug trade.

Question. Can you expound on the specifics of the U.S. international drug control policy; and I would like, if you will, for you to particularly highlight your efforts in the areas of interdiction and shutting down the flow to high density trafficking areas.

Answer. The fundamental principle of the National Drug Control Strategy is to reduce drug use through a mix of supply and demand policies. Throughout the first strategy, released in September 1989, and the second volume, published last January, our goals have remained the same.

The Strategy's international initiatives increase military, law enforcement, and economic assistance to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia; increase cooperative law enforcement efforts with Mexico; and strengthen money-laundering and other drug-related financial crimes to become an Administration priority. Interdiction efforts focus on the Southwest Border; expanding the Department of Defense role in the detective and monitoring phase of interdiction; and expanding DOD support to border control agencies. The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HISTA) Program recognizes that drug trafficking in certain areas affects the entire nation; and designates five areas to be the focus of intensified law enforcement activities.

As required by law, the President will submit a third strategy document to Congress early next year.

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